September 2006
Featured Disciplinary Case
Topic
Conditioning Federal Reinstatement upon State Court Readmission Does Not Offend the Supremacy Clause
Summary
In re Zena D. Crenshaw, 2006 WL 2787619 (7th Cir. September 25, 2006). Crenshaw was licensed in Indiana in 1984. In her thirteenth year of practice, State Judge Jeffrey Dywan entered a $14,134 judgment against her and her client payable to her opposing counsel and the defendants in a civil case. The judge concluded that an amended complaint that she filed in the case, as well as her continuing conduct in the litigation, was “unreasonable and groundless.” In response, Crenshaw scheduled and held a press conference in Gary, Indiana. She was quoted by the Gary Info as saying:
I contend that Judge Dywan’s action was taken against me because of my race which is African American and my sex which is female. This week, I will be forwarding those charges to the Indiana Civil Rights Commission as well as the Judicial Qualifications Commission.
True to her word, she filed complaints against Dywan with the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications and the Indiana Civil Rights Commission wherein she alleged:
…[Judge Dywan] entered a judgment against me for $14,134 together with costs of the action pending before him as Sanchez, et al. vs. Hoffman LaRoche, Inc., et al…Judge Dywan entered this Order against me in clear absence of all jurisdiction, contrary to relevant trial rules and case law, and in violation of my right to due process because of my race, which is Black or African American and/or my sex, which is female; As a direct and proximate result of Judge Dywan’s unlawful act of race discrimination against me, I am deterred from practicing law in the Lake Superior Court, Civil Division, Room No. One (1), Sitting at Hammond, Indiana, and effectively denied access to the services and facilities that it makes available to Caucasian attorneys, duly licensed to practice law.
The Judicial Qualifications Commission dismissed her claim after initial inquiry. The Civil Rights Commission did not consider her claim because it lacked jurisdiction over a state court proceeding. Later, she filed a civil rights lawsuit,
Crenshaw vs. Dywan, et al., in state court. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, Judge Rudy Lozano presiding. After learning the identity of the judge assigned the case, she filed a motion to disqualify, which the judge duly denied. Undeterred, she filed a second motion to disqualify. In that motion, she alleged that, in 1986, she and then-attorney Lozano were opposing counsel in a civil case pending in state court and:
Lozano apparently harbors personal animosity against [the respondent] stemming from their interaction as opposing counsel in the case of Ash versus Chandler and that he consciously or unconsciously sanctioned her in 1993 to exact revenge for that encounter….During a brief exchange in the recessed courtroom of the Lake Superior Court in East Chicago, Indiana, Judge Lozano commented to Ms. Crenshaw that he wished she would “sit on his lap.”
Judge Lozano granted her second motion to disqualify and reassigned the case to another federal district judge. He found, however, that the allegations of his improper conduct were false and that the alleged comment did not occur. He found further that the allegations were made for the improper purpose of manipulating the judicial proceedings. Nonetheless, he granted the second motion to disqualify to avoid the appearance of bias or prejudice. Eventually, disciplinary charges were lodged against Crenshaw for her statements about both judges. As to Dwyan, a hearing officer determined that Crenshaw had failed to offer any credible evidence or any believable testimony or documented proof to show that his award of costs and fees was based on race or gender. As to Lozano, the hearing officer found that her allegations were not supported by evidence and were totally devoid of merit. The hearing officer recommended a thirty day suspension and the Supreme Court of Indiana adopted that recommendation and suspended her, effective October 2, 2004. Approximately $6,000 in costs was then imposed against her in the disciplinary proceeding. She petitioned for a waiver of costs, but the Indiana Supreme Court denied her petition and extended her suspension until she paid the costs. She refuses to pay and remains suspended.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana imposed reciprocal discipline and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied Crenshaw's appeal of that order. Shortly thereafter, the Southern District of Indiana suspended her with the suspension to “expire upon respondent's [Crenshaw's] reinstatement to practice before the Indiana Supreme Court.” She appealed that order and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
She argued in the Seventh Circuit that the district court neglected to realize that she was unable to pay the costs and thus erred in requiring her readmission to the state bar as a condition to reinstatement in the federal bar. The Court rejected her argument, noting that state disbarment proceedings are entitled to great weight and should generally be granted deference in federal disbarment proceedings. Moreover, Crenshaw failed to demonstrate an inability to pay. The Indiana Supreme Court provided her the opportunity to do so and found her “unverified statement” to be “lacking in any supporting evidence” and thus insufficient to support a waiver of costs. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, until she pays the costs or demonstrates an inability to pay them, the Indiana Supreme Court has legitimate grounds for her continued suspension from the bar.
Most important for purpose of disciplinary procedural law, however, was the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of Crenshaw’s second argument. It is a common practice in disciplinary law to have a licensing authority impose reciprocal discipline and condition reinstatement only upon successful readmission to practice in the jurisdiction where sanction was first imposed, usually where a state supreme court disciplined the lawyer and a federal court imposes reciprocal discipline. Crenshaw argued that her protracted suspension from the Indiana state bar runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause because the state suspension essentially dictated the terms of her federal suspension. Her argument might have some merit in another federal appellate jurisdiction (See e.g., Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520 (3rd Cir. June 2, 2006). June 2006 NOBC Case of the Month http://www.nobc.org/cases/0606.asp), but not in the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit ruled that:
[T]he Supremacy Clause is not implicated here because the Southern District of Indiana in its discretion conditioned Crenshaw's suspension on her status in the Indiana state bar. Thus, her state suspension does not conflict with “or stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment” of a federal objective.
NOTE: This is an unpublished order of the United States Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Rule 53 of the Seventh Circuit, no unpublished order of any court may be cited as precedent in the Seventh Circuit.
